Kinds Of Minds: Toward An Understanding Of Consciousness (Science Masters Series)

A Daniel Dennett Dualism 2008-10-11

Reviewer: James Gerofsky

If you've read anything written within the past 20 years on 'philosophy of mind' or the mystery of human consciousness, you've no doubt come across the name Daniel Dennett. Dr. Dennett is a noted expert in the field of mind and consciousness. Dennett is not just another armchair philosopher, as he frequently collaborates with psychologists and neuroscientists in the design and evaluation of empirical studies. He has published a great number of articles and books, many of which are readable by the interested layperson. Unfortunately, most of these works are quite voluminous. "Kinds of Minds" is a relatively short summary of Dennett's paradigms and ultimate contentions regarding the conscious brain. It's great for those like myself who want to experience Dennett but don't have the time to digest a few thousand pages of dense, technical prose.

You should approach Dennett in two different ways; in philosopher talk, Dennett requies an epistemological dualism. On the one hand, Dennett provides a wide range of extremely useful interpretation of neurological and psychological data; he masterfully interweaves the human mind with the brain, body and social environments that support it. Dennett is a brilliant scholar, and even in a short book like this he manages to provide amazing insights on what our minds are doing and why they are doing it. At some point, however, Dennett crosses a hazy boundary between analysis and personal interpretation, and you need to invoke the second approach, a cautious stance toward his strong but not universally accepted opinions.

This second aspect of Dennett is actually what he is best known for outside of professional circles. At the start of this review, I spoke of the "mystery" of human consciousness. Dennett has made his reputation denying that mystery, contending that our conscious self-awareness and sentient experience of the world surrounding us is no more beyond our understanding than is the flexing of our arms, the beating of our heart, or the digestion of what we eat. Dennett vigorously denies the dualist contention that "something more" is metaphysically involved in human sentience, something beyond what our scientific paradigms can currently explain and predict.

"Kinds of Minds" wavers back and forth between Dennett I and Dennett II, although as the book progresses the first aspect wanes as aspect II waxes. Thus, by the middle of the book you will be greatly impressed by the breadth and depth of Dr. Dennett's understanding of the known facts, but you will also see where he wants to go. Will he make it? He appears to have momentum, enough to convince you that all of our ideas, feelings, inspirations and impressions are the workings of complex machinery, and can ultimately be broken down to the operation and interaction of organic machines within the bigger machine that is nature itself. You brace yourself for the evisceration of all hope that there exists something more to our lives than this. And then you reach the end and nothing like that has happened, even though Dennett repeatedly claims that it has.

What actually happens is that Dennett provides plenty of reasons why the dualist paradigm cannot be called "science". Sentience as it is described by Dennett is too fuzzy, too patchy, too inconsistent. But then again, so were lightening and magnetism and chemistry, once upon a time. Perhaps our intellectual paradigms are not yet powerful enough to explain the difference between pain (i.e., electro chemical processes in the brain and the nerve system when a part of the body experiences traumatic injury) and suffering, the usual - but not entirely predictable - mental response to pain. Strangely enough, it is Dennett who points out this difference in the final chapter, just as he claims triumph over any remaining dualist 'superstition'. He admits that the pain-suffering distinction is a "blurred notion", one found in everyday "folk thinking"; and yet he terms it "valuable and intuitively satisfying", after mocking and rejecting the similarly blurred and yet satisfying concept of experiential "qualia" (satisfying to me anyway).

The personality of a book's author often seeps through when discussing the mind, and Dennett leaves plenty of evidence as to his own ironic, pessimistic views regarding nature and humankind. His existential cynicism become apparent in his reference to sexual frustration, in his fascination with baby cuckoos destroying eggs and other hatchlings so as to win all of the food that their "adopted motherbird" can provide, and in his citation of fraud and deception as key motivations for the development of complex language abilities in humans. This final notion is at odds with 18th Century Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid and his conjecture that innate veracity and credulity are the cornerstone of language and effective social interaction. Both philosophers would admit to both veracity and deception as human social traits, but as to which represents the horse and which is the cart . . . obviously Daniel Dennett takes the darker view.

Once the dust settles, Dennett is seen to have tackled the Cartesian straw man without erecting anything new to support a monistic mental paradigm using available scientific concepts. Sure, we can now explain why we THINK without reference to unknown metaphysical realms; but can we really explain why we FEEL (i.e. why we have "qualia", including suffering but also including joy)? Dennett offers simplicity as the reward for denying dualistic insistence upon sentience. But what if Plank, Bohr and other turn-of-the-previous-century scientists had clung to the mantra of simplicity when faced with challenges to classical electromagnetic field theory? Quantum physics was certainly not a simple solution, but it was ultimately the right (or at least "righter") one.

So read Dennett, by all means, and benefit from the broad, sweeping vistas he provides regarding the vexing question of "mental intentionality" and other difficult topics along the border of philosophy and neuroscience. But beware as he beckons you towards the edge of what we now know about the mind. The drop-off into mental nihilism that Dennett invites is severe, consequential and not yet intellectually required. It may not ever be.

The right approach 2007-08-19

Reviewer: meadowreader

To the question, "Where does human consciousness come from?", somebody (I think it may have been William James) answered, "From animal consciousness." Unless one accepts some non-naturalistic explanation, I think that has to be right, and Dennett, who is a philosopher not a biologist, goes squarely up that Darwinian road. Not enough is known to make the whole journey without any gaps, but his account of evolutionary development from Darwinian creatures, to Skinnerian, to Popperian, to Gregorian ones, and of how those transitions might have occurred, is extremely suggestive about the major aspects of the route that has culminated (so far) in the human kind of mind. Exciting stuff, no doubt about it.

The book is very well-written, but not an easy read in a few sections, where steps in the argument are more suggested than explicitly stated. I think that's to be expected at the frontier of any science -- and everything about this subject matter lies at the ragged edge of knowledge and speculation. That problem no doubt is exacerbated by the space constraints that this series of short science books imposes. But the overall explanatory approach and framework are clear and persuasive. Dennett's recommendations for further reading are especially good.

Highly recommended.

Very interesting philosohical exploration 2006-04-23

Reviewer: Nicholas Sterling

I could feel my brain stretching as I read this book. It is philosophical but readable.

The main focus of this book is, as implied by the title, the notion that there are several qualitatively different ways that organisms adapt to their environments -- it isn't simply a matter of one organism being "more intelligent" than another. He presents a succession of clear models, increasing in sophistication, for how an organism's behavior can be modulated to improve its chances of reproductive success. I had never thought about these qualitatively different "levels of sophistication," but they make perfect sense to me -- kind of an "Aha!" experience.

I liked it.

Brilliant and accessible 2005-08-26

Reviewer: Jesse Liberty

As usual, Daniel C. Dennett brings precision to a topic often muddied by wishful thinking, unsupported suppositions and entrenched predisposition. His insights are keen and this book makes a wonderful and accessible introduction to both his books on consciousness (e.g., Consciousness Explained) and his books on evolution (e.g., Darwin's Dangerous Idea).

wonderful 2005-03-11

Reviewer: Sidney Jahnsen

commenting on one only aspect of this book may be misguiding as it is so rich of theories, arguments and scientific information.
To summarize I just say that Dennet seems like the Freud of conciousness.